Harcourt argues that in clinical contexts, children and young people with mental health illness can experience epistemic, specifically testimonial, injustice when their perspectives are unjustifiably discounted by health service providers.1 Our goal in this commentary was to illustrate how caregivers, a critical component of CYP treatment triad, can also engage in testimonial injustice towards CYP patients. Testimonial injustice occurs when one suffers a credibility deficit and that credibility deficit is based on prejudice.2 Harcourt expands Fricker’s account of testimonial injustice by (...) arguing that for CYPs, the credibility deficits attributed to them by clinicians, for example, may result from epistemic arrogance in that CYPs are viewed as having unreliable knowledge about their condition. Harcourt writes: ‘Being a CYP is treated as a heuristic for epistemic unreliability across a wide range of domains’, including clinical settings. Harcourt’s expansion of Fricker’s account thus includes epistemic arrogance as an alternative necessary condition, in addition to prejudice, to apply the concept of testimonial injustice. We think Harcourt’s argument can also be extended to caregivers, who are central to the CYP treatment triad. We illustrate how this may be the case by drawing from research we conducted to understand the perspectives of clinicians and prospective families, both caregivers and paediatric patients with obsessive–compulsive disorder about the possibility of …. (shrink)

We examine whether mindfulness can neutralize the negative impact of COVID-19 stressors on employees’ sleep duration and work engagement. In Study 1, we conducted a field experiment in Wuhan, China during the lockdown between February 20, 2020, and March 2, 2020, in which we induced state mindfulness by randomly assigning participants to either a daily mindfulness practice or a daily mind-wandering practice. Results showed that the sleep duration of participants in the mindfulness condition, compared with the control condition, was less (...) impacted by COVID-19 stressors (i.e., the increase of infections in the community). In Study 2, in a 10-day daily diary study in the United Kingdom between June 8, 2020, and June 19, 2020, we replicate our results from Study 1 using a subjective measure of COVID-19 stressors and a daily measure of state mindfulness. In addition, we find that mindfulness buffers the negative effect of COVID-19 stressors on work engagement mediated by sleep duration. As the COVID-19 pandemic is ongoing and the number of reported cases continues to rise globally, our findings suggest that mindfulness is an evidence-based practice that can effectively neutralize the negative effect of COVID-19 stressors on sleep and work outcomes. The findings of the present study contribute to the employee stress and well-being literature as well as the emerging organizational research on mindfulness. (shrink)

Building on contemporary research in embodied cognition, enactivism, and the extended mind, this book explores how social institutions in contemporary neoliberal nation-states systematically affect our thoughts, feelings, and agency. Human beings are, necessarily, social animals who create and belong to social institutions. But social institutions take on a life of their own, and literally shape the minds of all those who belong to them, for better or worse, usually without their being self-consciously aware of it. Indeed, in contemporary neoliberal societies, (...) it is generally for the worse. In The Mind-Body Politic, Michelle Maiese and Robert Hanna work out a new critique of contemporary social institutions by deploying the special standpoint of the philosophy of mind—in particular, the special standpoint of the philosophy of what they call essentially embodied minds—and make a set of concrete, positive proposals for radically changing both these social institutions and also our essentially embodied lives for the better. (shrink)

From farmers’ markets to primetime television cooking shows, notions of ‘knowing where our food comes from’ and ‘reconnecting’ with the sources of our food are now central to a range of contemporary cultural movements and popular media texts. While these ideas have primarily been mobilized by those with activist commitments to ethical and sustainable food production, they are also increasingly appearing in the media and marketing strategies of large agribusiness and retailing corporations, including those of the major Australian supermarkets. This (...) paper explores some of the techniques currently used by major supermarkets to respond to criticisms about their food ethics, market control and relationship with producers. Using a case study of Australian supermarket Coles and its integration of its ‘Helping Australia Grow’ campaign into reality television cooking show, My Kitchen Rules, it will consider the textual practices of, and social media response to, Coles’ sponsorship and integrated advertising strategies of putting a ‘face’ to the farmers who produce the products found on supermarket shelves. By emphasizing to Coles customers that they, too, can ‘know where their food comes from’ and that their purchasing decisions support individual farmers and family farms rather than large conglomerates, these strategies help to locate Coles within a network of meanings that seek to both shift and contest negative perceptions of the supermarket chain’s corporate practices and food politics in ways that potentially complicate the activist discourses from which they draw. (shrink)

Infertility patients and patient advocates have long argued for classifying infertility as a disease, in the hopes that this recognition would improve coverage for and access to fertility treatment. However, for many fertility patients, including older women, single women and same-sex couples, infertility does not represent a true disease state. Therefore, while calling infertility a ‘disease’ may seem politically advantageous, it might actually exclude patients with ‘social’ or ‘relational’ infertility from treatment. What is needed is a new conceptual framing of (...) infertility that better reflects the profound significance of being infertile for many people and the importance of addressing infertility in order to improve their lives. In this paper, we argue that the capability approach provides this moral underpinning. The capability approach is concerned with what people are able todo, and whether they are able to act in a way that is in keeping with their own values and goals. The ability to procreate and build a family is a fundamental capacity and can be a major part of self-fulfilment, regardless of sexual orientation or family arrangement. Since the capability approach asks us to conceive of equality in terms of equal capabilities, it provides a strong ethical impetus for society to help those who cannot conceive on their own to do so with assisted reproduction. (shrink)

This volume is the first to bring together original work by leading philosophers and psychologists in an examination of the moral psychology of contempt.

What is given to us in conscious experience? The Given is an attempt to answer this question and in this way contribute to a general theory of mental content. The content of conscious experience is understood to be absolutely everything that is given to one, experientially, in the having of an experience. Michelle Montague focuses on the analysis of conscious perception, conscious emotion, and conscious thought, and deploys three fundamental notions in addition to the fundamental notion of content: the (...) notions of intentionality, phenomenology, and consciousness. She argues that all experience essentially involves all four things, and that the key to an adequate general theory of what is given in experience lies in giving a correct specification of the nature of these four things and the relations between them. (shrink)

Prenatal genetic testing is becoming available for an increasingly broad set of diseases, and it is only a matter of time before parents can choose to test for hundreds, if not thousands, of genetic conditions in their fetuses. Should access to certain kinds of fetal genetic information be limited, and if so, on what basis? We evaluate a range of considerations including reproductive autonomy, parental rights, disability rights, and the rights and interests of the fetus as a potential future child. (...) We conclude that parents should be able to access information that could be useful during pregnancy, but that testing for non-medical information should be limited. Next, we argue that the government lacks a compelling state interest in regulating prenatal genetic testing and propose that regulation should occur through medical professional organizations. Finally, we present a framework for determining what testing physicians should recommend, offer neutrally, or not offer at all. (shrink)

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 12, Issue 6, Page 53-55, June 2012.

How does mental content feature in conscious thought? I first argue that for a thought to be conscious the content of that thought must conscious, and that one has to appeal to cognitive phenomenology to give an adequate account of what it is for the content of a thought to be conscious. Sensory phenomenology cannot do the job. If one claims that the content of a conscious thought is unconscious, one is really claiming that there is no such thing as (...) conscious thought. So one must either accept that there is such a thing as cognitive phenomenology, or deny the existence of conscious thought. Once it is clear that conscious thought requires cognitive phenomenology, there is a pressing question about the exact relationship between a thought’s cognitive phenomenological properties and its content. I conclude with a discussion of the nature of this relationship. (shrink)

Lee emphasizes the need to better understand the moral relationship between researchers and participants connoted by precision medicine, with the framework of “the gift” offering bioethics a...

Many contemporary philosophers have been concerned about whether there is a fundamental distinction between perception and cognition. Although I do not think there is a fundamental distinction between perception and cognition, at least given what I take perception to be, I do think there is a fundamental distinction between sense and cognition, which I will argue is best understood in terms of a distinction between two irreducible kinds of phenomenology: sensory and cognitive.

A long time ago, I procured a little book edited by Soren Kierkegaard entitled The Sickness Unto Death (1849). What is more, I read it. (I must confess to having been first attracted to it solely by its title). For and as a tribute to Alastair Hannay I was inspired to set down in print this brief (altogether too brief, philosophically speaking) and unsystematic reflection. What struck me most palpably was the suggestion that, although our worldly endeavors and thus our (...) publications are, so to speak, temporally limited, our despair is not. I write on the obligations and privileges of that mood. (shrink)

"Based on the true life experiences of a recovering corporate executive, award-winning journalist, yogi, wife, mother and survivor of fifty years of life.".

Argues that the War on Drugs and policies that deny convicted felons equal access to employment, housing, education and public benefits create a permanent under-caste based largely on race. Reprint. 12,500 first printing.

Health equity matters, but there is no universally accepted definition of this or associated terms, such as inequities, inequalities, and disparities. Given the flexibility of these terms, investigating how policymakers understand them is important to observe priorities and perhaps course correct. Accordingly, this study analyzed the perceptions high-level policymakers within the WHO African Region. An online survey was distributed to attendees of the WHO’s Fifth Health Sector Directors’ Policy and Planning Meeting for the WHO African Region by email. After responses (...) were collected, both inductive and deductive coding were applied. Inductive coding was undertaken to glean central concepts from free-form responses on understandings of health equity and deductive coding was used to assess alignment with four theories of distributive justice using a coding framework. In analyzing central concepts, three became apparent: access to health services and/or health care, financial protection, and recognizing subgroups. And when we investigated alignment with theory, most respondents’ understandings of health equity aligned with Rawls’ ‘Theory of Justice’ (95%). Of these responses, 70% were exclusively aligned with Rawls’ ‘Theory of Justice’ and 30% aligned also with another theory (this 30% was split 55% utilitarianism and 45% Sen’s Capabilities Approach). Respondent understandings of health equity showed limited alignment with other theories of distributive justice, which were: utilitarianism (n = 7/39; 17.95%), Sen’s Capabilities Approach (n = 5/39; 12.82%), and libertarianism (n = 2/39; 5.13%). Our study demonstrates that alignment with certain theories is tied to specific themes (i.e., theoretical underpinnings may guide policymakers to favour certain policy approaches). For instance, a utilitarian-minded policymaker may be focused on a widespread vaccination campaign, whereas a Rawlsian-aligned policymaker may focus on a targeted approach to reach communities that have lower vaccination rates, and a Senian-aligned policymaker may focus on health literacy programs targeted at addressing vaccine-hesitant individuals within communities with lower vaccination rates. These findings can guide high-level policymakers and international organizations to optimize decision-making by clarifying ethical alternatives. (shrink)

Work on situated cognition and affectivity holds that cognitive and affective processes always occur within, depend upon, and, perhaps, are even partially constituted by the surrounding social and environmental contexts. What some philosophers call a ‘mental institution’ consists of various tools and technologies that help people to solve a particular problem and scaffold their cognitive and affective processes in various ways. Examples include legal systems, scientific practice, and educational systems. I propose that insofar as it centers around technology and involves (...) a particular set of rules, practices, and shared expectations, the online learning environment can be understood as a mental institution. It shapes not only what and how students learn, but also how they understand the value and fundamental aims of learning. I argue that insofar as this mental institution both reflects and perpetuates neoliberal aims and values, it is in danger of limiting students’ communicative abilities and soliciting them to view higher education in distorted, limiting ways. (shrink)

The human species is more reliant on cultural adaptation than any other species, but it is unclear how observational learning can give rise to the faithful transmission of cultural adaptations. One possibility is that teaching facilitates accurate social transmission by narrowing the range of inferences that learners make. However, there is wide disagreement about how to define teaching, and how to interpret the empirical evidence for teaching across cultures and species. In this article I argue that disputes about the nature (...) and prevalence of teaching across human societies and nonhuman animals are based on a number of deep-rooted theoretical differences between fields, as well as on important differences in how teaching is defined. To reconcile these disparate bodies of research, I review the three major approaches to the study of teaching – mentalistic, culture-based, and functionalist – and outline the research questions about teaching that each addresses. I then argue for a new, integrated framework that differentiates between teaching types according to the specific adaptive problems that each type solves, and apply this framework to restructure current empirical evidence on teaching in humans and nonhuman animals. This integrative framework generates novel insights, with broad implications for the study of the evolution of teaching, including the roles of cognitive constraints and cooperative dilemmas in how and when teaching evolves. Finally, I propose an explanation for why some types of teaching are uniquely human, and discuss new directions for research motivated by this framework. (shrink)

Although mental health professionals traditionally have been viewed as sole experts and decision-makers, there is increasing awareness that the experiential knowledge of former patients can make an important contribution to mental health practices. I argue that current patients likewise possess a kind of expertise, and that including them as active participants in diagnosis and treatment can strengthen their autonomy and allow them to build up important habits and skills. To make sense of these agential benefits and describe how patients might (...) act as co-regulators of a therapeutic encounter, I look to the enactivist notion of “participatory sensemaking”. (shrink)

Using mobile health research as an extended example, this article provides an overview of when the Common Rule “applies” to a variety of activities, what might be meant when one says that the Common Rule does or does not “apply,” the extent to which these different meanings of “apply” matter, and, when the Common Rule does apply, how it applies.

Research on human cadavers is an important mechanism of scientific progress and comprises a large industry in the United States. However, despite its importance and influence, there is little ethical or regulatory oversight of cadaver-based research. This lack of transparency raises important ethical questions. Thus, this paper serves as a call for ethicists and regulators to pay increased attention to cadaver research. I argue that cadaver research ought to be considered a subset of human subjects research and held accountable to (...) higher ethical standards. After describing current practices, I argue that oversight of cadaver research as a form of human subjects research is appropriate because cadaver research is similar to other types of human research, participants in cadaver research incur risks of harm, and a current lack of oversight has allowed the cadaver industry to entice research participation through ethically questionable practices. This paper urges greater dialogue among human subjects research ethicists and regulators about what constitutes appropriate protections for participants in cadaver research. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper was to determine whether the individual attributes of locus of control, gender, major in college and years of job experience affect the acceptability of certain workplace behaviors. A total of 198 college students of a mid-sized southeastern university formed the sample for this study. Locus of control, gender and years of job experience were found to have some affect on whether an individual considered a certain behavior acceptable or unacceptable.

The SARS-CoV-2 (COVID-19) pandemic continues to expose underlying inequities in healthcare for black, indigenous and Latinx communities in the USA. The gaps in equitable care for communities of colour transcend the diagnosis, treatment and vaccinations related to COVID-19. We are experiencing a continued gap across racial and socioeconomic lines for those who suffer prolonged effects of COVID-19, also known as ‘Long COVID-19’. What we know about the treatment for Long COVID-19 so far is that it is complex, requires a multidisciplinary (...) approach and there is still much research needed to fully understand the effects. In this paper, we discuss pragmatic considerations for including affected communities, relevant stakeholders, and leaders from communities of colour in the planning and implementation of Long COVID-19 research. (shrink)

"On ne naît pas féministe, alors comment le devient-on? Et comment les vagues féministes se sont-elles succédé? Première universitaire à enseigner l'histoire des femmes en France au début des années 70, Michelle Perrot revient ici avec Eduardo Castillo sur ce qui l'a construite, ses lectures, son engagement. Elle donne à voir un siècle de bouleversements et la profondeur des luttes qui agitent aujourd'hui nos sociétés. Pas à pas, l'ouvrage nous guide dans cette épopée en explorant toutes ses ramifications : (...) l'histoire du patriarcat et des progrès de l'égalité, celle des grands débats féministes sur le corps, le genre, l'universalisme face au différentialisme, la sororité, MeToo. La grande histoire se mêle au destin des femmes qui l'ont portée et l'on dialogue avec Olympe de Gouges, Hubertine Auclert, Monique Wittig ou encore Arlette Farge, ainsi qu'avec toute la nouvelle génération de penseuses et de militantes. Intime et théorique, livre d'histoire et autobiographie, Le Temps des féminismes met en perspective tous les clivages du féminisme contemporain, avec la générosité et la distance d'historienne de Michelle Perrot."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)